{"id":285,"date":"2015-07-09T01:50:54","date_gmt":"2015-07-09T07:50:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/supportthebitkovs.com\/?post_type=news&p=285"},"modified":"2015-10-31T02:03:29","modified_gmt":"2015-10-31T08:03:29","slug":"occidente-ha-cambiado-su-pensamiento-sobre-rusia-op-ed","status":"publish","type":"news","link":"https:\/\/supportthebitkovs.com\/en\/news\/occidente-ha-cambiado-su-pensamiento-sobre-rusia-op-ed\/","title":{"rendered":"West Has Changed Its Thinking on Russia (Op-Ed)"},"content":{"rendered":"By:<\/strong>\u00a0John Lough
\nReference:\u00a0<\/strong>The Moscow Times\u00a0<\/a><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/p>\n

Discussions are under way in\u00a0several Western capitals on\u00a0how to\u00a0develop a\u00a0broad strategy to\u00a0counter the\u00a0dangers to\u00a0Europe posed by\u00a0Moscow’s decision to\u00a0break out of\u00a0the security system that it co-authored with the\u00a0West at\u00a0the end of\u00a0the Cold War.<\/p>\n

For

governments that have tried for\u00a0nearly 25 years to\u00a0develop relations based on\u00a0partnership and\u00a0cooperation with Russia, the\u00a0adjustment to\u00a0a model of\u00a0confrontation and\u00a0competition is challenging both intellectually and\u00a0institutionally, particularly since the\u00a0expertise of\u00a0the Cold War generation of\u00a0analysts and\u00a0strategists has been largely lost.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0first challenge is to\u00a0accept that for\u00a0all the\u00a0effort expended, the\u00a0attempt to\u00a0build relations with Russia based on\u00a0shared values and\u00a0interests failed. While Western countries made many mistakes in\u00a0their handling of\u00a0Russia, in\u00a0particular, the\u00a0backing of\u00a0economic reforms that created oligarchic capitalism, the\u00a0fundamental reason for\u00a0this outcome was Russia’s relapse into\u00a0a traditional model of\u00a0governance and\u00a0its insistence on\u00a0the need to\u00a0undercut the\u00a0independence of\u00a0the other post-Soviet countries to\u00a0ensure its security.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Russian leadership is seeking a\u00a0new set of\u00a0rules that give Russia the\u00a0right to\u00a0limit its neighbors’ sovereignty. This is part of\u00a0a broader effort to\u00a0reduce the\u00a0dominance of\u00a0Western institutions and\u00a0realign global forces to\u00a0Russia’s advantage.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0objective is to\u00a0secure and\u00a0reinforce the\u00a0existing Russian development model by\u00a0reducing external competitive pressures. For\u00a0all its internal logic, this strategic choice carries enormous risks. Confronting the\u00a0West deprives Russia of\u00a0an important balancing force in\u00a0handling its relations with China and\u00a0threatens to\u00a0isolate Russia from\u00a0the sources of\u00a0modernization traditionally provided by\u00a0Europe.<\/p>\n

Russia is using a\u00a0mix of\u00a0powerful instruments to\u00a0achieve its goals: for\u00a0example, political, diplomatic, economic, military and\u00a0information tools. However, Russia is playing a\u00a0strong hand from\u00a0a fragile base. It has clear economic weaknesses and\u00a0over time, its internal political cohesion could prove brittle in\u00a0the absence of\u00a0improved governance and\u00a0social provision.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0West needs to\u00a0see the\u00a0bigger picture and\u00a0focus on\u00a0encouraging Russia back on\u00a0to a\u00a0reformist course with adapted foreign and\u00a0security policies that are stabilizing for\u00a0Russia and\u00a0Europe. Rapid Western technological development coinciding with the\u00a0stagnation of\u00a0the economy forced the\u00a0Soviet leadership in\u00a0the 1980s to\u00a0reshape the\u00a0international environment to\u00a0provide it with a\u00a0breathing space to\u00a0reform.<\/p>\n

What is striking about Russia’s behavior over the\u00a0past 15 months is that Moscow has returned seemingly without concern to\u00a0the policies of\u00a0confrontation that the\u00a0Soviet Union abandoned because they were unaffordable.<\/p>\n

This has happened at\u00a0a time when the\u00a0Russian economy had already begun to\u00a0stagnate after its impressive successes a\u00a0decade ago. It clearly lacks the\u00a0resilience to\u00a0sustain high levels of\u00a0military spending over the\u00a0medium to\u00a0long term.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0outline of\u00a0an effective Western strategy is simple. It needs to\u00a0play for\u00a0time to\u00a0apply its strengths against Russia’s weaknesses. The\u00a0foundations should consist of\u00a0five elements. First, making it clear to\u00a0Moscow that Western countries remain wedded to\u00a0the principle that countries in\u00a0Europe, both large and\u00a0small, have the\u00a0sovereign right to\u00a0conduct their own foreign policies and\u00a0choose their allies as they wish. Second, reinforcing the\u00a0integrity of\u00a0NATO.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0alliance’s military capabilities have been hollowed out over the\u00a0past 25 years in\u00a0the absence of\u00a0a perceived threat from\u00a0Russia. NATO countries took a\u00a0firm stance on\u00a0Russia’s actions at\u00a0last year’s Wales Summit and\u00a0they need to\u00a0continue along this path. Above all, they need to\u00a0underline their determination to\u00a0uphold the\u00a0credibility of\u00a0collective defense.<\/p>\n

Third, signaling to\u00a0Russia that Ukraine will not be left to\u00a0fail. This is going to\u00a0require much larger Western financial assistance as well as the\u00a0type of\u00a0technical assistance at\u00a0which the\u00a0EU excels. Western countries will also need to\u00a0reinforce their current support for\u00a0Ukraine, particularly in\u00a0the areas of\u00a0defense cooperation, energy sector reform, security of\u00a0gas supplies and\u00a0broader institutional reform.<\/p>\n

Fourth, keeping sanctions in\u00a0place with the\u00a0possibility of\u00a0their expansion as long as Russia continues to\u00a0undermine the\u00a0sovereignty of\u00a0its neighbors.<\/p>\n

For\u00a0some European countries, the\u00a0economic losses are going to\u00a0be harder to\u00a0bear than for\u00a0others. Sanctions pain can also be seen as an\u00a0investment in\u00a0the EU’s and\u00a0NATO’s defenses. Sanctions take time to\u00a0work and\u00a0they may already have constrained Russian behavior in\u00a0Ukraine. Fifth, educating Western publics about the\u00a0dangers to\u00a0Europe from\u00a0current Russian policies.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0Pew Research Center’s recent Global Attitudes survey showed that societies in\u00a0Europe are well informed about Russia and\u00a0have drawn certain conclusions about its behavior. However, they have not concluded that their countries need to\u00a0reinvest in\u00a0defense.<\/p>\n

Western countries are now engaged in\u00a0a competition with Russia over whose security vision for\u00a0the continent should prevail. They should have the\u00a0confidence that if they apply the\u00a0right strategy over the\u00a0medium to\u00a0longer term, the\u00a0advantage will lie with them and\u00a0Russia will be under increasing pressure to\u00a0abandon its current policies.<\/p>\n

The\u00a0critical question is whether they have the\u00a0will to\u00a0do so.<\/p>\n

John Lough is an\u00a0associate fellow with the\u00a0Russia & Eurasia Program at\u00a0Chatham House and\u00a0a vice president with BGR Gabara, a\u00a0London-based strategy-consulting firm.<\/div>

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